"Darah dan Nyawa saya akan mengantar Bangsa Papua ke Pintu Kemerdekaan," Alm. Ondofolo Dortheys Hiyo Eluay

PDP stands for Presidium Dewan Papua or Papua Presidium Council.  PDP was established on Papua National Congress II 2000, in Port Numbay, capital of West Papua on 29 May - 4 June 2000. PDP is the re-emerged form of the New Guinea Council, established by the Crown of the Netherlands on 1 December 1961 by the name of the Nieuw Guinea Raad, in the Papua National Congress I 1961, which legally still has the legal base to act representing Papuans in West Papua. The Gazette of the establishment of Nieuw Guinea Council and the approval of West Papua Flag, National Anthem , the Name of the Nation and the name of the State and the geographical boundaries have never been legally cancelled. Therefore, legally, under the UN De-colonisation Rules, West Papua is still a colonised state, which was re-colonised by Indonesia. This page presents more about the PDP, its work, its goals and missions and much more.

Brief History   The resignation of the late military-dictator Soeharto from his presidential seat brought about political reformation across the archipelago currently called Indonesia. The reformation also brought an air of freedom of people to gather and express their opinions.  Papua Presidium Council was established after a series of lobbies and meetings between Papuan leaders as well as Jakarta - Port Numbay in their efforts to calm down the aspiration for West Papua independence that came out spontaneously.  An obvious example is the Late Dortheys Hiyo Eluay himself, the Chairperson of the DMP (Dewan Musyawarah Pepera - The Act of Free Choice Consultative Council). He led pro-integration campaigns across West Papua and successfully manipulated the vote and claimed victory that all 1,025 Papuans appointed by the Indonesia authorities voted in favour of Indonesia. Theys knew those against his move, therefore, he banned them, chased them and even killed them. Thirty years later, he found himself to play the same role he played during the integration campaigns. But the atmosphere was different. For one thing, there is no strong leadership in Jakarta, so if he tries to defend Jakarta, it might be counter-productive for his political future. He was excluded from appointed as a provincial member of parliament in the last general election by Great Gen Soeharto. He needed to establish his own political platform as a bargaining position for his political life. Most probably he expected that the pro-independence campaign he was about to launch will alert Jakarta and that it pays special attention on himself. But it didn't go that way. Jakarta became weak, so weak politically and could not control conflicts various parts of the archipelago. President BJ Habibie allowed options for independence and special autonomy for East Timor that resulted in more than 80% voted in favour of independence. At the same time, the voice of independence campaigners in West Papua became stronger and stronger. When FORERI (Reconciliation Forum of Irian Jaya People) was set up in West Papua, Theys refused to be part of it, as he regarded this was a move to back up the independence movement. Even though he was speaking out for independence, he was not genuinely for his people. After some consultations and negotiations among Papuan leaders, they (FORERI, lead by Willy Mandowen and Tom Beanal and LMA - Papua Customary Council, led by Theys himself) finally agreed to meet at the Papua Grand Assembly. This Assembly produced resolutions.  The most important resolution of all is the proposal to call a Papua Peoples' Congress II 2000. This time, the Indonesian president was KH Abdurrahman Wahid, an Islam clergy, with the heart for humanity, democracy and demilitarisation. Wahid or commonly known as Gus Dur regarded the move in West Papua helping his regime to shape the politics in Indonesia by allowing freedom of assembly and expression as well as promoting the decrease of military role within the Indonesian politics. As part of his beliefs, he allowed and funded the Papua Peoples' Congress II 2000. This Congress was the second one. The first one, according to Papuan People, was held on 1 December 1961, in which attributes of West Papua as a state and nation were legally introduced and approved by the Government of the Netherlands as the colonial power at that time.  This second Congress of the Papuan people produced six resolutions, mainly re-affirming the product of Papuan Peoples' Congress I 1961 and refusing international conspiracy that brought about the fate of West Papua and her people into nightmare. For the first time ever, all Papuan people from across the western half of New Guinea Island, came and gathered and expressed their aspiration in the Congress. More than 5,000 tribal people were dancing outside, while about 32 PDP members and more than 500 Papua Panel members were in the Cenderawasih Sport Hall, Port Numbay, attending the congress.  Almost everyone knew that the Papuan elites had a deal with Jakarta that this congress was not really intended to declare independence or separation from Indonesia. The people were well aware that it that was the goal, then now Indonesian authority would have allowed and funded it.  The congress were divided into commissions. Commission One on Political Affairs became the target of the enemies' campaigns. Members of the commission were continuously intimidated and threatened to be killed if they speak for independence. No single person in that commission was scared, but in fact these fueled them to even speak louder and more openly. Commission One on Political Affairs was the last commission to complete sessions as there were conflicting arguments in resolutions on pro and contra independence. But finally, the commission approved very historic and significant resolutions for the whole nation.  When all members of the Commission One arrived, all were crying and shouting, "Die for your people, do your best, do not scared of the Indonesians. We are here to defend you!" With cheers and cries, the members of the commission were also burst into tears, walking in towards the hall with full of tears. Faces of suffering and hope can be seen as the people looked at those tearing members of the Commission One entering the hall. Every one along the path into the hall gave their arms to shake hands with all members of the Commission One. They all did, and they all cried. Did the outcome of this commission bring about changes in West Papua politics?  Did Jakarta respond favourably? What PDP has done to follow-up the congress? These three questions are the key ones for the future of West Papua. There is no answer to these questions at the moment, unfortunately. What we have is more questions, unfortunately. But what we can do at the moment is let this history pass, and let the history itself teach the world and particularly the Papuans. PDP Now Worries Some people still question, "Is PDP really for independence movement, or just an effort by Jakarta supported by local elites to eliminate or neutralise the aspiration for West Papua independence?" This question does not come out by itself. Of course there are some reasons for that very question. First, some people ask, "How come the Indonesian President Gus Dur funded the congress? If it is not for the sake of Jakarta, for what else? Secondly, others still question, "How come the PDP has done almost nothing except the Papua Peoples' Congress and no follow up actions?" The most apparent one was its promise to report the progress of its work by 1 December 2000, but it avoided to do so. Third, "Why does not PDP have a kind of Manual for the Struggle for public readership? How come this organisation to determine the future of a nation does not have Plans of Actions? How come the information on the PDP not available to the world?" (Of course, this is not related to classified documents, but at least the world should be informed, the Papuans have the full right for access to information from the organisation dealing with their fate.) Fourth, "Why doesn't PDP clarify its position and opinions on various political, environmental and human rights problems in West Papua?" Or more specifically, "Why do they listen to Jakarta more than to the Papuans, the people who they claim they represent?" An example is when Theys was assassinated, Papuan people wanted to keep his corpse until 1 December 2001, but Jakarta said he should be buried soon,   and so did the PDP.  Another example is related to human rights violations in West Papua. Almost all incidents happened in West Papua are just ignored by the PDP elites as if they were due to robbery or other criminal conducts. These people have been intimidated, terrorised, raped, and killed just because they stand for the PDP and its mandate for a free and independent West Papua, nothing else. And PDP does nothing against these. These are just a few hints into understanding what is really happening behind the scenes of West Papua Politics. Good Signs But then, only some months later, it became more obvious that the pro-independence power and influence within the PDP itself became stronger and won its influence. Dramatic changes on the attitudes and political statements by the PDP happened. One obvious example is when Jakarta passed the Special Autonomy Bill on 22 October 2001, six hours ahead of this bill being passed, the PDP held an urgent meeting they strongly refused the Special Autonomy Bill, and quiet surprisingly, the PDP expressed its deep appreciation and honour, from the deep heart of the Papuan people, to the work and campaigns of the Liberation Army of Free Papua Movement (TPN/OPM) since 1963. This last phrase never been expected to come out from the PDP dictionary of politics, but the fact is it did come out.  What has changed so far? In fact it became apparent to the pressure groups within the PDP that Jakarta is no longer an ally or some one who can listen to the voice of the Papuan people. They expected Jakarta to open its doors and windows of heart and communicate on the basis of humanitarian principles, as fellow human beings. That door was shot down, instead a different door was opened by President Megawati Sukarnoputri, i.e., the door of national integrity and security approach in managing the government. The shift from humanitarian government into Megawati's blind-nationalism principles turned Theys Eluay and his colleagues into a contradictory direction. Most Papuan leaders have been proud of Mega's father, founding father and the first president of Indonesia, Dr. Soekarno. They expected their favourite-revolutionary-leader's daughter will bring about changes to the fate of the Papuan people, as she also promised to deliver in her campaigns for more than 3 decades. Her security-approach and centralised policy, particularly in this case in passing the Special Autonomy Bill angered Papuan elders and they turned their back on her. Jakarta angered, Papuans cheered that their leaders are now on their side. This is the very time when Jakarta made up its mind to finish the life of The Late Ondofolo Dortheys Hiyo Eluay. The Future of PDP It does make sense to argue that PDP is another word for Provisional Government of West Papua, which will finally become the formal Government of West Papua. However, particularly Demmak argues that the system of governance of the PDP in most ways does not reflect the reality of Papuan society as this form is a pure top-down system of governance. Demmak proposes what it calls the Tribal Systems of Governance, under the name of Tribal Democracy.  Finally, Papuan people themselves will have to decide what form of government they want to be under, or what kind of regime suit them all. There is no explanation needed the top-down system, but Tribal Democracy advocates confederation of Papuan tribes, just the same as the system applies to the European Union, with Presidency Seat (Role) for every year/ term chaired by one of the elders (for E.U. by one of the heads of states). Tribal Democracy will not follow the Federal System of the USA, but Confederation System of the E.U. Note: The views particularly in this page presented based on the analysis of the writer.